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ABSTRACT
For centuries, children have been used in times of war—serving as porters, cooks, spies,
sex slaves, and soldiers. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is still pervasive today with an
estimated 300,000 children involved in armed conflict as of 2015. This applied project
examines a possible method for preventing the illegal practice of using children in
combat by employing a new technology centered on community-based early warning
theories. I seek to understand if implementing a text-based, mobile crowdsourcing
platform in remote communities in Sub-Saharan Africa will be successful in predicting
Lord’s Resistance Army raids, thereby reducing the number of children abducted and/or
forcibly recruited. By harnessing the power of mobile phone technology in conflict
prevention, communities and individuals become empowered to protect themselves
against an attack rather than relying solely on external interventions. If this program is
successful, it could be scaled and replicated to prevent other human rights abuses from
occurring across the world.
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1. INTRODUCTION & STUDY SETTING

“My squad is my family, my gun is my provider, and protector, and my
rule is to kill or be killed.”
– Ishmael Beah,
Former child soldier and author of
“A Long Way Gone: Memories of a Boy Solider”

“It may seem unimaginable to you that child soldiers exist and yet the
reality for many rebel and gang leaders, and even state governments, is
that there is no more complete end-to-end weapon system in the
inventory of war machines than the child soldier. Man has created
the ultimate cheap, expendable, yet sophisticated human weapon at the
expense of humanity's own future: its children.”
– Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire
Founder of Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative and former
Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Rwanda

In 2011, I was fortunate enough to spend a few weeks in a refugee camp in
northwestern Uganda. Even with all of the amenities my gracious hosts had to offer me,
life in the camp was difficult. While I was offered lodging in a shelter built out of
concrete, most of the homes occupied by the camp’s some 38,000 residents were
constructed out of mud and metal sheets collected from food drop containers. The
villagers I lived with walked two hours a day to harvest rice from their plots of land. The
process of harvesting the rice by hand is a grueling endeavor—one I can personally
testify to. And there were many days that we went thirsty due to a lack of rainfall.
Most of the refugees in this particular settlement fled from neighboring
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997 to escape the violence that erupted during the
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second civil war; and even though life in the camp was not easy, every person I spoke
with was grateful for the chance at a life free from the bloodshed they experienced back
home. The people with whom I stayed were eager to share their tales of horror and
describe what they had witnessed as they ran for their lives across the border more than a
decade earlier. Night after night, I lived vicariously through my new friends’ stories as
they described in great detail the unspeakable violence they endured as children—an
experience so impactful, it lingers with me today as though I had lived it myself.
As these narratives unfolded throughout the weeks, I noticed that most of the
anecdotes I heard had one common and very disturbing theme: children being used as
weapons of war. Although I had heard of the term ‘child soldier’ before, I had not
realized the extent of the brutality involved in all aspects of children in armed conflict. I
heard stories of brothers and sisters being forced to mutilate, maim, or even kill their own
family members before being inducted into a guerilla armed group. I was told that
abductions were commonplace during this time and many people claimed they were
‘lucky’ to have narrowly escaped the clutches of militia members as they raided village
after village in search of children to capture.
The compassion I felt for my kind and generous hosts transformed into a deep
desire to do anything I could do to prevent children from enduring the trauma of being
involved in armed conflict in the future. The following applied project stands as the
culminating result of years-long research and the tangible product of my promise to do
what I could do to prevent the horrors that my friends in Uganda lived through from ever
happening again. It is my hope that this project will inspire other child advocates to
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search for innovative and ambitious approaches to protect future generations from
enduring this inconceivable trauma.
1. a. Scope of Issue - Children in Armed Conflict
The use of children in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon; children have
been involved in military campaigns and armed militia groups for centuries, “as ratcatchers on warships, or as drummer boys on the battlefields of Europe.”1 Even the word
‘infantry,’ for foot-soldiers, can also mean a group of young people. 2 However, since the
1970s, the use of children in conflict has grown tremendously with the proliferation of
light weapons. These ‘small arms’ are “revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and
carbines; submachine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns” which make even very
small children as efficient a combatant as their adult counterparts.3 Such lightweight
assault rifles, most notably the AK-47, allow armed groups the ability to exploit children
in ways that were previously impossible. These children are now able to wield weapons
of their own, making them very effective war machines for guerilla groups and militias.
The growing prevalence of these type of weapons, known as ‘small arms,’ in
conflict areas around the world increased the number of children forcibly recruited to
take part in direct hostilities. According to a 2006 statistic, children were present in 40
percent of the world’s “armed forces, rebel groups, and terrorist organizations” and

1. "Children In War: The State Of The World's Children", Unicef.Org, 1996,
https://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm.
2. Ibid.
3. "UN Secretary-General Report On Small Arms", Un.Org, 1997,
http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html.
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fought in “almost 75 percent of the world’s conflicts.”4 As of 2015, an estimated 300,000
children were thought to have taken part in armed combat—but not necessarily as
soldiers.5 Although though the proliferation of small arms enabled the use of children as
soldiers, children were and continue to be exploited in combat in a myriad of other ways.
In parts of East and Central Africa, for instance, an armed opposition group called the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has made worldwide headlines for their systematic
abduction of children from homes, schools, and communities where they are “tortured,
threatened, and sexually abused.” 6 These child victims are forced to commit unspeakable
atrocities such as killing their own parents or maiming family members as a way to
initiate them into the group. And the latest reports suggest that the LRA has “now turned
to selling abducted children into slavery in exchange for arms.”7 Since not all children
forcefully recruited will be made into soldiers or even hold a gun during their time in
captivity, contrary to what may be commonly believed, it is important to understand how
children in combat are legally defined in the global landscape.

4. Peter Singer, The Enablers Of War: Causal Factors Behind The Child Soldier
Phenomenon, 1st ed. (repr., Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).
5. "Child Soldiers Around The World", Council On Foreign Relations, 2017,
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/child-soldiers-around-world/p9331.
6. "The Use Of Children As Soldiers In Africa Report: A Country Analysis Of
Child Recruitment And Participation In Armed Conflict", Reliefweb.Int, 2011,
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C157333FCA91F573C1256C1300
33E448-chilsold.htm.
7. Ibid.
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1. b. Defining ‘Children in Armed Conflict’
There is a legal, international consensus that a ‘child’ is defined as “a person
under the age of 18, unless national laws mandate an earlier age of majority.”8 Although
this international law clearly describes the parameters of a ‘child,’ one major area of
contention among scholars and lawmakers alike concerns the definition of what
constitutes a ‘soldier.’ The term ‘child soldier’ can refer to many aspects of children’s
involvement in armed conflict. These youths do not have to be explicitly engaged in
armed hostility to be considered a ‘child soldier.’ They can work as porters, messengers,
cooks, or sex slaves (aka ‘bush wives’) to other soldiers.9 For the purposes of my
research, I will use the broader term of ‘children in armed conflict’ or CAC, which is
consistent with the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
Convention on the Rights of the Child 2007 Principles Relating To The Status Of
National Institutions, otherwise known as the ‘Paris Principles’. The Paris Principle
guidelines on children associated with armed forces or groups considers the term to be
equivalent to the following description:

8. "Convention On The Rights Of The Child", Ohchr.Org, accessed 6 April 2017,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx.
9. Jens Christopher Andvig and Scott Gates, "Recruiting Children For Armed
Conflict", in Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States, 1st ed. (repr., Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 2009), 77-92; Rachel Brett and Margaret
McCallin, Children: The Invisible Soldiers, 1st ed. (repr., Stockholm: Save the Children,
Sweden (Rädda barnen), 1998); "Child Recruitment And Use | United Nations Office Of
The Special Representative Of The Secretary-General For Children And Armed
Conflict", United Nations Office Of The Special Representative Of The SecretaryGeneral For Children And Armed Conflict, 2017,
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/childsoldiers/; Scott Gates and Simon Reich, Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States,
1st ed. (repr., Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).
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‘A child associated with an armed force or armed group’ refers to any
person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by
an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited
to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers,
spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking
or has taken a direct part in hostilities. 10
These guidelines are very helpful in elucidating which persons are compulsorily entitled
to protections under international law and those who are eligible for convictions,
sentencing, and criminal charges for engaging in armed warfare against civilians or nonmilitary combatants. But most importantly, this definition expands the concept of a ‘child
soldier’ to include the numerous other roles children fall prey to during a conflict, which
is extremely useful in understanding the nature of child exploitation in times of conflict.
This definition has also been useful for lawmakers in the creation of legislation
attempting to prohibit this practice.
Over the past 40 years, significant headway has been made in the codification of
laws protecting children from conflict exploitation. Despite the advances made to
criminalize the practice however, there have been difficulties in the enforcement of these
laws at the domestic level for several reasons. Primarily, children are abducted by militia
groups through pre-planned raids.11 It has been well-documented that children are taken
from their homes or school by armed groups seeking to benefit from adolescent
manipulability.12 These groups operate outside the law and are often difficult or near

10. "Principles Relating To The Status Of National Institutions (Paris Principles)",
Ohchr.Org, accessed 16 April 2017,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfNationalInstitutions.aspx.
10. T. W. Bennett, "Using Children In Armed Conflict: A Legitimate African
Tradition? Criminalising The Recruitment Of Child Soldiers", ACT Initiates Actions
Against Abuse Of Children In Armed Conflict In Africa, 1998.
12. Ibid.
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impossible to stop by local law enforcement due to varying factors such as poor
governance, a lack of infrastructure, and limited security resources.13 Amnesty
International campaigner, Andrew Philip, remarks also that commanders of militia groups
that use children “…know it's a war crime, but they seem to believe they'll never be
brought to justice. There is a sense of rampant impunity."14 Alongside a sense of
impunity, the social dislocations of war involving the separation of families and
economic hardships can also leave children vulnerable to abduction.
Not all children in combat, however, are physically abducted and forced to join.
Often times children are coerced into joining state military groups or armed militias for a
variety of reasons including financial compensation from governments—seeing it as the
only way to survive in times of conflict—or as a means of obtaining honor as soldiers are
often revered in local communities.15 Also, a significant lack of birth registration or age
verification documents in certain areas of the world can make legal enlistment difficult or
even impossible. The unique challenges that arise from child engagement in armed
conflict are highlighted by author T. W. Bennett:
Whether children enlisted of their own free will or were forcibly
conscripted, their involvement in armed conflict presents quite obvious
dangers. Not only are young people ill-equipped to cope with the physical
dangers they encounter, but their immaturity poses an additional threat to
the safety of other combatants. Although less obvious, the long-term social
consequences are possibly even more harmful.16

13. Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers In Africa, 1st ed. (repr., Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
14. Carroll Rory, "Sham Demobilisation Hides Rise In Congo's Child
Armies", The Guardian, 2003,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/sep/09/congo.rorycarroll.
15. Bennett, "Using Children In Armed Conflict," 22.
16. Ibid., 1-2.
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The consequences of child involvement in hostilities present a growing global concern
for all parties involved. Several scholarly works have focused on the societal
consequences that CAC have on local communities as well as the radiating negative
impacts of this practice to the economic status countries in which CAC are present.17 A
University of Sussex study, for example, found that Ugandan ex-CAC had hindered longterm economic performance due to a loss in years in education and schooling. 18 This had
tremendous negative impacts on their employability and contributed to Uganda’s low
employment rates. The obvious and not-so-obvious implications of involving children in
armed conflict have gained the attention of people around the world who wish to see this
practice abolished once and for all.
Despite the numerous legal mechanisms at the international, regional, and
domestic levels directly prohibiting it, the practice of abusing children by making them
take part in violent conflict is just as pervasive today as it was centuries ago. It is with
this understanding that I seek to explore practical and effective methodologies of ending
the exploitation of children in times of conflict and proffer a potential solution.
1. c. Research Question
My research explores past and current methods of ending the forcible recruitment
of children into armed conflict in Africa. I chose to focus my research on initiatives in

17. Andvig and Gates, "Recruiting Children For Armed Conflict," 77-92; K.
Barstad, "Preventing The Recruitment Of Child Soldiers: The ICRC Approach", Refugee
Survey Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2008): 142-149, doi:10.1093/rsq/hdn056; Gates and
Reich, Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States; Singer, The Enablers Of War.
18. Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "The Consequences Of Child
Soldiering", Review Of Economics And Statistics 92, no. 4 (2010): 882-898,
doi:10.1162/rest_a_00036.

9
Africa because 40 percent of all children involved in armed combat live in African
countries and the continent is known as the “epicenter” for children in conflict.19 (While
the focus of my work is centered on Africa, it is my hope that the results will be
transferrable to other areas as well.)
With this in mind, I seek to understand which prevention measures have been most
successful in reducing the number of children recruited into armed conflict. Even though
there has been notable success in rehabilitation programs for former children in armed
conflict, these methods only seek to heal the wounds previously inflicted. 20 I am more
concerned with practical solutions that could lead to more systemic changes versus
relying on current methods that focus primarily on rehabilitation and reintegration after
children have been released from their captors. By preventing the child from ever
enduring the atrocities committed during captivity, it would bypass the child’s suffering
from ever occurring and thereby end the need for trauma healing programs.
With this in mind, I have created an applied project that takes into consideration
the scholarly research on the phenomenon of CAC, burgeoning theories that technology
is an amplifier of conflict prevention, and real-world case studies that demonstrate the
effectiveness of these technological approaches. This research builds on recently
developed technological applications for conflict prevention and I believe it has the
potential to bring about positive outcomes if it were to be deployed. The following

19. Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, "No Place To Hide: Refugees, Displaced
Persons, And Child Soldier Recruits", in Child Soldiers In The Age Of Fractured States,
1st ed. (repr., Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 56.
20. "Healing Child Soldiers", Bulletin Of The World Health Organization 87, no.
5 (2009): 330-331, doi:10.2471/blt.09.020509.
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section outlines the proposed application and summarizes the guiding principles that
should allow it to achieve the goal of eradicating the use of children in armed conflict.
1. d. Project Overview
The organization Invisible Children created an Early Warning System that utilizes
satellite phones and radios to communicate and track the whereabouts of the armed
militia group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The LRA is a violent armed group that
is often responsible for mass killings, torture, and is well-known for mass abductions of
children to serve in their infantry. 21 This warning system was developed in 2011 and has
been successful in disseminating life-saving information about when village raids may
occur. This project has been hailed as “by far the most accurate, up-to-date, and
comprehensive source of information on LRA atrocities, which the partners hope will
improve efforts to protect vulnerable communities in the region.” 22 According to
Invisible Children’s 2016 Midyear Security Brief, the team’s regular crisis reports
have generated years of solid historical and real-time data, which has been helpful in
predicting LRA raids and protecting communities. 23 The brief, however, also
underscored an urgent need to “strengthen and expand the Early Warning Network
include remote communities that are not currently able to access or share information on
LRA activity but who remain affected by LRA violence” in order to successfully end

21. P. W. Singer, "Talk Is Cheap: Getting Serious About Preventing Child
Soldiers", Cornell International Law Journal 32, no. 20 (2004): p. 572,
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol32/iss3/20.
22. Patrick Meier, "Crisis Mapping: How Invisible Children's Kony 2012
Campaign Changed Advocacy", CS Monitor, 2012,
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2012/0309/Crisis-mappingHow-Invisible-Children-s-Kony-2012-campaign-changed-advocacy.
23. Ibid.

11
LRA violence.24 For that reason, I have chosen to focus on increasing the efficiency of
this program through the use of SMS text messaging.
In the past few years there have been remarkable strides made toward combatting
violence, corruption, and threats of natural disasters in developing countries via the
collection of data through text messaging. 25 In 2014, the United Nations Development
Programme partnered with Australian telecom MobiMedia to develop a SMS-based
reporting system that allows citizens in Papua New Guinea to anonymously monitor
corruption in their Department of Finance. This system, dubbed Phones Against
Corruption, utilizes the power of crowdsourcing in rural areas to expose and combat
political corruption.26 The interactive SMS system is free of charge for users, anonymous,
simple to use on any basic mobile phone device, and does not require the internet. This
innovative approach has helped the Papua New Guinean government reduce the
corruption that was once rampant.
It is based on this technological method that I have created a mobile phone
crowdsourcing platform with the purpose of preventing forced recruitment and abduction
of children captured in LRA raids. It is called the AuCourant Early Warning Network. I
chose this name for two reasons. First, the term ‘au courant’ is a French expression
meaning ‘well informed.’ It is important that the name is in French since it will be

24. Ibid.
25. Anthony Bloome, "Mobile Technologies Helping To Fast Forward Quality
Education | Archive - U.S. Agency For International Development", USAID.Gov, 2012,
http://2012-2017.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/youth-mobiletechnology/mobile-technologies-helping-fast-forward-quality.
26. "Phones Against Corruption - Observatory Of Public Sector Innovation",
Oecd.Org, 2014, https://www.oecd.org/governance/observatory-public-sectorinnovation/innovations/page/phonesagainstcorruption.htm.

12
operating in countries where French is one of the national languages. Second, the name
also connotes a current or flow of information, which will hopefully indicate to the user
that they are contributing to a network of communities.
This interactive SMS platform will allow users in remote areas affected by the
LRA (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and the Central
African Republic) to subscribe to AuCourant and submit anonymous information
concerning the whereabouts of LRA militiamen. These users will be able to select their
language, identify where the sighting occurred, and provide any other pertinent
information that would help organizations such as Invisible Children to prevent potential
attacks. Once deployed, this service will be able to send emergency notifications to all
subscribed users when raids might occur in their area.
The reason Invisible Children did not initially integrate mobile phone technology
into their early warning system is due to the fact that when it was established in 2011,
there were only 18 million cell lines in the country of DRC. 27 Essentially, there were not
enough cell users in the country for this kind of integration to be effective and the
infrastructure did not exist to support this kind of crowdsourced data. In 2014, however,
mobile phone company Vodacom installed over 150 ultra-low cost cell towers through
the DRC and over 40 in LRA-affected provinces.28 In 3 years, they more than doubled

27. "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency", Cia.Gov, 2018,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html.
28. United States Agency for International Development, "Cell Towers
Strengthen Security In DRC" (repr., USAID, 2014),
https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/cell-towers-strengthen-securitydrc.
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the number of cell lines to 37.75 million and that number is expected to rise exponentially
in the next five years. 29
There are now enough mobile phone users to be able to provide consistent
information to Invisible Children and, potentially, to other humanitarian organizations
seeking to prevent child abductions. The platform is designed so that it is replicable,
scalable, and translatable to other fields. It is my hope that this platform will be integrated
with the Invisible Children early warning system to increase the efficiency and scope of
the network so that more lives will be saved and more children will be spared from the
horrors of forced recruitment. The subsequent chapters will outline the theories upon
which this project has been built, how it will be implemented in the field, how it seeks to
end the continued use of children in conflict.
2. SYNOPSIS OF THE FIELD
The research on the topic of children in armed conflict is extensive and spans
many disciplines. For decades, scholars have attempted to understand the phenomenon of
CAC through peer-reviewed publications such as journal articles and books. The
proliferation of this literature is made possible with the accessibility of statistics
published by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations, and
reports distributed by state governments. Additionally, the news media has chronicled
this practice in-depth and is an excellent source of information in the field where NGOs
might be unable to reach.
The main areas of research I will be focusing on for my applied project are
international law and human rights, child recruitment and conscription in Africa, and

29. "The World Factbook”, Democratic Republic of Congo.
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CAC prevention and intervention, and information communication technology for
conflict preparedness and prevention. Within these fields, much research has been
conducted on the reasons behind the use of children in armed conflict despite the legal
mechanisms in place to protect them, the impetus for children to voluntarily join in
violent hostilities, and recommendations for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former
CACs and the prevention of this practice in whole. 30
The first step in approaching this research is understanding what it means to be a
child involved in armed conflict, how they are classified and identified, and what roles
these children often play in their forced or voluntary obligations. I will examine the role
of international humanitarian law in defining and codifying laws concerning children
since the human rights movement of the 1970s. I will then outline the research on CAC
voluntary enlistment, the methods being recommended to remedy the inadequacies of
laws concerning them, and the initiatives currently being studied in intervention and
prevention methods.
2. a. International Law on the Rights of the Child
Significant headway has been made in the codification of laws protecting children
from exploitation since the 1924 League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the
Child, which sparked the dialogue on the issue of the rights of children. Below is a
snapshot of the some of the most monumental laws, conventions, and treaties that

30. Ilene Cohn, "A Call For State Action To Prevent The Recruitment And Use
Of Children As Soldiers In State Armed Forces And State Allied Armed
Groups", Journal Of Human Rights Practice 6, no. 1 (2014): 182-190,
doi:10.1093/jhuman/hut029; Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder, Child Soldiers:
From Recruitment To Reintegration, 1st ed. (repr., Basingstoke [etc.]: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
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followed after that landmark Declaration. This timeline illustrates how instrumental the
Declaration was in terms of bringing about more attention to the rights of the child:
•

1924 – League of Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child,

•

1948 – United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

•

1949 – Geneva Conventions,

•

1950 – European Convention on Human Rights,

•

1951 – Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,

•

1966 – United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights,

•

1969 – American Convention on Human Rights,

•

1977 – Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,

•

1981 – African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

•

1984 – Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,

•

1989 – United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and

•

1990 – Organization on African Unity (OAU) African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child.
The next most important contribution to children’s rights was the United Nations

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Adopted in 1990, the CRC is a
foundational treaty that outlines provisions defending all children’s right to life, survival,
and development. This Convention, which was ratified by all self-governing states apart
from the United States, defines a child as “a person below the age of 18, unless the laws
of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger.”31 The member states who
ratified this Convention have an obligation to incorporate these guiding principles into
their national legal structures and uphold the standards enumerated in the treaty by all

31. "Convention On The Rights Of The Child".
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feasible measures. 32 This landmark Convention paved the way for additional international
treaties addressing more specific issues of child human rights abuses, such as CAC.
Although the 2007 Paris Principles created a definition for children in armed
conflict, the preceding Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(OPAC), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000, specifically outlawed child
involvement in armed conflict. With 130 signatories and 10 ratifications, this Convention
proved to be instrumental in the protection of children from state military recruitment.33
This treaty reaffirms children’s rights to special protections and condemns the “targeting
of children in situations of armed conflict.”34 The treaty recognizes the uniquely harmful
effects and long-term consequences of the recruitment and forceful conscription of CAC.
The Convention emphasizes the vulnerable nature of children and the responsibility the
global community has in safeguarding them from exploitation, particularly in times of
conflict. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol obliges state parties to “take all feasible
measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of
18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”35 Other Articles go on to prohibit the
compulsory recruitment of persons under the age of 18, ban the use of children by non-

32. Ibid.
33. "Status Of Treaties: 11. B Optional Protocol To The Convention On The
Rights Of The Child On The Involvement Of Children In Armed Conflict",
Treaties.Un.Org, 2017,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11b&chapter=4&lang=en.
34. "Optional Protocol To The Convention On The Rights Of The Child On The
Involvement Of Children In Armed Conflict", Ohchr.Org, accessed 17 April 2017,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPACCRC.aspx.
35. Ibid.
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state actors and guerrilla forces, and compels ratifying governments to do everything in
their power to uphold these provisions.
The scope of these Conventions, however, is limited. The Conventions only have
‘legal teeth’ in the states that have signed or ratified them. Also, the protections laid out
in the Optional Protocol, for example, do not require a complete ban on the use of
children since the wording “take all feasible measures” is not a total prohibition.36
Additionally, the Protocol received other criticism from the International Committee of
the Red Cross for the phrase “take part in direct hostilities,” which opens up the
possibility that children could be involved indirectly in conflict as spies, porters, or
helpers in other ways. 37 These and other loopholes—coupled with exiguous
ratifications—have allowed for the use of children in conflict, either by governmental
armed forces or opposition militias, around the world. The shortcomings of these legal
protections that are meant to prevent children from engaging in armed conflict are widely
discussed in academic and governmental institutions alike with the goal of addressing the
loopholes that facilitate abuse. 38

36. "Treaties, States Parties, And Commentaries: Protocol Additional To The
Geneva Conventions Of 12 August 1949, And Relating To The Protection Of Victims Of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977", Ihl-Databases.Icrc.Org,
accessed 23 August 2017, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/COM/470750098?OpenDocument.
37. Ibid. (emphasis added).
38. Ilene Cohn and Guy Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers: The Role Of Children In
Armed Conflicts, 1st ed. (repr., New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1994).
International Committee of the Red Cross, "ICRC Legal Protection Of Children In
Armed Conflict", 2003, https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1033/children-legalprotection-factsheet.pdf; Peter W Singer, Children At War, 1st ed. (repr., Berkeley [u.a.]:
University of California Press, 2009); Michael Wessells, "Child Soldiers, Peace
Education, And Postconflict Reconstruction For Peace", Theory Into Practice44, no. 4
(2005): 363-369, doi:10.1207/s15430421tip4404_10.
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As of 2017, there are an estimated 230 million children currently living in areas
affected by armed conflict, which puts them at great risk for being recruited or
conscripted into these conflicts.39 And the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that
300,000 children around the world are used as combatants today while nearly half a
million additional children serve in armies not currently at war.40 However, the debate
continues to rage on concerning how states are meant to implement domestic laws that
adhere to international standards considering the government’s discretion in
interpretation.41 This discretion allows the state to interpret and internalize international
law provisions in a variety of cultural contexts, within a myriad of different legal
traditions, and through the lens of various societal and historical conditions. 42 How, and
if, the state chooses to implement the provisions at the domestic level speaks to not only
the legal systems but also the religious and cultural norms which shape perceptions of
that society.

39. Volker Druba, "The Problem Of Child Soldiers", International Review Of
Education/ Internationale Zeitschrift Fr Erziehungswissenschaft/ Revue Inter 48, no. 34
(2002): 271-278, doi:10.1023/a:1020309527289; "UNICEF Press Release", UNICEF.Org
- More Than 1 In 10 Children Living In Countries And Areas Affected By Armed
Conflict, 2015, https://www.unicefusa.org/press/releases/unicef-more-1-10-childrenliving-countries-and-areas-affected-armed-conflict/21551.
40. “Child Soldiers Around The World”.
41. Laura Lundy, Ursula Kilkelly and Bronagh Byrne, "Incorporation Of The
United Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child In Law: A Comparative
Review", The International Journal Of Children's Rights 21, no. 3 (2013): 442-463,
doi:10.1163/15718182-55680028; Matthew Happold, "Child Soldiers In International
Law: The Legal Regulation Of Children's Participation In Hostilities", Netherlands
International Law Review 47, no. 01 (2000): 27, doi:10.1017/s0165070x00000747.
42. Bennett, “Using Children In Armed Conflict”; Paul Tiyambe Zeleza and
Philip J McConnaughay, Human Rights, The Rule Of Law, And Development In Africa,
1st ed. (repr., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
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This shifts the conversation from the topic of international law to one of
understanding the factors, be they cultural or otherwise, which influence a child’s
decision to enlist, an adult’s desire to exploit children, and the government’s role in either
prosecutions or impunity of perpetrators. Since the promulgation of the international
treaties and the widespread recognition of the human rights movement during the 1970s,
scholars have attempted to explain and understand the factors allowing for the
perpetuation of this practice.43 Now that the legal foundations and theoretical
explanations concerning CAC have been elucidated, I will turn my examination to the
causes perpetuating the continuation of this occurrence.
2. b. Factors Perpetuating the Use of Children in Armed Conflict
Scholars have sought to understand the reasons behind the perpetuation of the
recruitment of CAC and why children might want to join of their own volition. These
‘push and pull factors’ are responsible for influencing the decision of either adults to use
children or of children to want to enlist themselves.44 As previously mentioned, the
occurrence of children who voluntarily choose to take part in hostilities has remarkably
been widely documented. This might seem unthinkable when one considers the danger
and trauma associated combat. The children who are voluntarily opt in to leave their

43. David M. Rosen, "Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, And The
Globalization Of Childhood", American Anthropologist 109, no. 2 (2007): 296-306,
doi:10.1525/a
44. Andvig and Gates, "Recruiting Children For Armed Conflict," 77-92; Cohn
and Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers; Wessells, "Child Soldiers, Peace Education, And
Postconflict Reconstruction For Peace", 363-369.
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homes and join are often drawn to engage due to the power, excitement, and glamour
associated with armed guerilla groups and the military.45
Additionally, children are often times compensated by state militaries for their
voluntarily enlistment. Particularly in impoverished countries where opportunities for
employment may be scarce, children may look to voluntary enlistment as a moneygenerating (and potentially life-saving) opportunity. Author Peter Singer, explores the
“socio-economic changes, technological developments, and the changing contexts of
war” that present the channels for children to become engaged in armed conflict.46 In
these ‘changing contexts of war,’ there is more economic instability and families must
strive harder to make ends meet. 47 It is in these situations that adults will either encourage
their children to enlist for money or even hand them over to the state military. It has even
been documented that rebel groups will recruit by flaunting the amount of money they are
able to make once they join—thereby attracting adolescents who are eager to earn money
and who may be lacking the necessary education or skills to obtain lawful employment.48
Authors Vera Achvarina, Scott Gates, and Simon Reich also discuss the linkages
between war and criminality in the context of civil wars and what can be done to remedy
the lack of systematic analysis of this human security issue.49 They argue that the

45. Karen Emmons, Adult Wars, Child Soldiers: Voices Of Children Involved In
Armed Conflict In The East Asia And Pacific Region., 1st ed. (repr., Bangkok, Thailand:
UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, 2002).
46. Singer, Children At War.
47. Ibid.
48. Francesca Capone, Child Soldiers: The Expanding Practice Of Minors
Recruited To Become Foreign Fighters, 1st ed. (repr., The Hague, The Netherlands:
Asser Press, 2016); “The Use Of Children As Soldiers In Africa”.
49. Achvarina and Reich, “No Place To Hide”, 56.
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problem of CAC is unlikely to resolve itself without the prescription of policy measures
to mitigate civil conflicts and address the special needs of child in war zones.50 These
studies reveal that the mechanisms for child recruitment are often linked to low a grossdomestic product of a country and when coupled with advances in light weaponry, this
leads to a higher proportion of child involvement.51 In these countries, children are seen
as easy and cheap methods for armed forces to mobilize, which contributes to the
worldwide proliferation of this practice—as of 2006, approximately 75 percent of
conflicts in the world involve children.52 With statistics like that, it is clear to see that the
issue of CAC spans multiple continents and is not—as it has been claimed— tied to a
“cultural or historical thread…or a set of historical experiences.” The widespread
prevalence of this occurrence has gained the worldwide attention of children’s rights
advocates in a multitude of disciplines.
2. c. Prevention & Intervention Methods
NGOs and international civil society members have also contributed significantly
to the global discussion on the best methods to eradicate the use of children and what
policies could be implemented to stem the flow of violence in countries with a history of
protracted armed conflict. Prominent organizations such as Invisible Children, Child
Soldiers International, Watchlist, the International Committee for the Red Cross,
UNICEF, and the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative seek to eliminate the use of
children in armed conflict through various programs such as training women in the
security sector, providing recommendations to governments to criminalize any type of

50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Singer, The Enablers Of War.
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recruitment or use of children in hostilities, campaigning for CAC awareness, and
advocating for legislative legal reform.
Research conducted by NGOs in recent years has drawn attention to the
prevention of the use of children in armed conflict.53 This is the primary area of focus as
it redirects the issue to the core of the problem: an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure. Many peer-reviewed articles, NGO reports, and child rights legislation offer
suggestions for what they consider to be the best method for preventing the use of
children in armed conflict. One of these methods include involving the security sector to
train and prepare governmental militaries on what to do when and if they encounter
underage fighters during battle.54 The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative focuses on
prevention by preparing the “military, police and peacekeepers to prevent the recruitment
and use of child soldiers” in countries such as Sierra Leone, Uganda, and even Canada,
by providing specialized training, tools, and resources.55 From the website, the Child

53. Barstad, “Preventing The Recruitment Of Child Soldiers”, 142-149; Child
Soldiers International, "BETTER THAN CURE: Preventing The Recruitment And Use
Of Children In The Chadian National Army. Missing Pieces In Chad’s Child Protection
Puzzle" (repr., London, 2012), https://www.childsoldiers.org/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=497d50a7-e5a0-4f16-9f2a-4d00bf2c04cb;
Roméo Dallaire, They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children: The Global Quest To
Eradicate The Use Of Child Soldiers, 1st ed. (repr., Toronto: Random House Canada,
2010); Holland Sam, Shelly Whitman and Roméo Dallaire, "Holland, Sam, Shelley
Whitman, And Romeo Dallaire. "Innovation In The Prevention Of The Use Of Child
Soldiers: Women In The Security Sector", PRISM 6, no. 1 (2016),
http://cco.ndu.edu/Publications/PRISM/PRISM-volume-6no1/Article/684610/innovation-in-the-prevention-of-the-use-of-child-soldiers-women-inthe-security/; Wessells, "Child Soldiers, Peace Education, And Postconflict
Reconstruction For Peace", 363-369.
54. Dallaire, They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children.
55. "Training - Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative", Roméo Dallaire Child
Soldiers Initiative, accessed 2 November 2017,
https://www.childsoldiers.org/en/training/#war-has-changed.
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Soldiers Initiative has made an impact by leading the way on research by “addressing
critical gaps in knowledge on child soldiers, pioneering work on child soldiers as an early
warning indicator of mass atrocities, and creating the world’s first training handbook
focused on child soldiers.”56
Unlike the training approach employed by the Child Soldiers Initiative, other
organizations recommend cutting to the core of the problem by increasing regional and
national security, increasing opportunities for education, and reducing poverty in
countries most afflicted by these practices.57 Organizations such as World Vision,
Catholic Relief Services, and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
(UNICEF) advocate for broader attempts to prevent conflict in areas with protracted
violence with the intent of reducing the need for child recruitment and abduction. While
these organizations may have specific programs that address the child victims of this
violence, those programs are typically geared toward disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of former child soldiers rather than pursuing a goal of prevention. 58 Since I
am most interested in prevention, I will now explore the most effective systems that have
been introduced to prevent children from becoming involved in armed conflict and how
these methodologies could be improved with technology.

56. Ibid.; The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative, "Child Soldiers: A
Handbook For Security Sector Actors" (repr., The Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers
Initiative, 2017), http://www.childsoldiers.org/publications/child-soldiers-a-handbookfor-security-sector-actors/.
57. Barstad, “Preventing The Recruitment Of Child Soldiers”, 142-149.
58. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "Child Soldiers And
Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation And Reintegration In West Africa: A
Survey Of Programmatic Work On The Involvement Of Children In Armed Conflict In
Côte D'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia And Sierra Leone" (repr., ReliefWeb, 2006),
http://www.child-soldiers.org/resources/Childsoldierscoalition-WestAfricasurvey2006.pdf.

24
2. c. i. Community-Based Prevention Initiatives
Although organizations dedicated to reducing the number of CAC are becoming
increasingly innovative in their methods, these programs often fail to recognize the
agency of the community members where these crimes are taking place. These programs
are reliant on involvement from lawmakers, security sector actors, government officials,
combatants, and civil society members for the most part; rarely is there a focus or even
mention of the role of the citizens living in high-risk areas and what they can do to
prevent their children from engaging in armed conflict. Be they the relatives of the
abducted children, witnesses of the raids, or community members living in areas where
these acts take place, I believe these individuals possess the missing key to addressing
this issue: first-hand information.
Although the previously mentioned prevention programs may see some success
with their methods, there have been recent studies that show the effectiveness of more
community-based methodology that focus on acquiring information from citizens versus
relying on data acquired through trained ‘outsiders’ (i.e. NGO workers and government
officials).59 The empowered effect that the individuals feel when they are able to
contribute to the safety of their community has been linked to “ensuring the sustainability
of the systems” and “reduc[ing] their vulnerability” in the face of violence. 60
Recommendations from Ruth Kahurananga, Child Rights Adviser for World
Vision International, also point to the growing need for community involvement in CAC

59. Margaret Macherera and Moses J. Chimbari, "A Review Of Studies On
Community Based Early Warning Systems", Jàmbá: Journal Of Disaster Risk Studies 8,
no. 1 (2016), doi:10.4102/jamba.v8i1.206.
60. Ibid.
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prevention. In an address to the 4th World Congress on Family Law and Child Rights in
2005, Kahurananga argues for the following changes to be made in order to achieve
higher success rates in prevention programs:
•
•
•
•

the empowerment of national citizens;
participation in decision making and drafting of resolutions by national citizens;
collaboration in the design, implementation, monitoring and reporting
mechanisms for strategies dealing with CAC; and
mobilisation of resources and capacity building in understanding international
humanitarian and human rights law relating to children 61
An evaluation and needs assessment conducted by USAID concerning the

prevention of LRA child abductions also mirrors Kahurananga’s theory by
recommending “strengthening community-based protection systems” by “bridging the
gaps in communication between LRA-affected communities, local authorities,
humanitarian agencies and the military.” 62 Unfortunately, the growing need for more
community-based participation in the effort to quell the CAC epidemic is not without its
share of logistical barriers. Since it has been argued that in order for prevention to be
more effective, locals should contribute their knowledge about how to solve the issue—
but how?

61. Ruth Kahurananga, "Children Affected By Armed Conflict: Child Rights Law
Vs Compliance" (repr., Cape Town, South Africa: 4th World Congress on Family Law
and Child Rights, 2005), http://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000297.pdf.
62. United States Agency for International Development, "Performance
Evaluation And Needs Assessment Report Of USAID Programming To Communities
Affected By The Lord’s Resistance Army In Central Africa" (repr., Vienna:
USAID/Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015),
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KS66.pdf.
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2. c. ii. Crowdsourcing Information
Given this context, it is easier to understand why gathering local knowledge is
extremely helpful, but it is also difficult to acquire; not only area these areas dangerous to
enter, but they are also remarkably ‘cut-off’ from the organizations trying to help them
due to the terrain and lack of infrastructure. 63 It is often problematic to communicate with
villages that do not have paved roads for travelling to and from, as well as areas that are
too entrenched in conflict that prevent NGO workers from visiting. These barriers,
physical and bureaucratic, present challenges for those advocates and researchers who are
trying to enter these spaces to collect data that could help understand the conflict and
prevent abductions.
As outlined previously (see Section 2.c.), the methods employed by NGOs to
address child abductions by the LRA have seen moderate success. However, there have
been promising results from the use of technology to increase communication between
the citizens and the agencies seeking to protect them from harm. 64 The introduction of
mobile phones to “crowdsource” information has been theorized to reduce protracted
violence in remote areas of the world. 65 ‘Crowdsourcing’ is “a method of data collection
that draws on voluntary contributions from an unbounded crowd to determine answers to
questions” and is generally done “through mobile phones using text-based polls and

63. "The World Factbook", Democratic Republic of Congo.
64. C. P. Martin-Shields, "Inter-Ethnic Cooperation Revisited: Why Mobile
Phones Can Help Prevent Discrete Events Of Violence, Using The Kenyan Case
Study", Stability: International Journal Of Security & Development 2, no. 3 (2013): 1-13,
doi:10.5334/sta.cu; Macherera and Chimbari, "A Review Of Studies On Community
Based Early Warning Systems"; USAID, "Cell Towers Strengthen Security In DRC".
65. Martin-Shields, "Inter-Ethnic Cooperation Revisited", 1.
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surveys (but can really be done in any way that allows a public audience to provide
feedback to a question.)”66 Conflict analysis scholar, Charles Martin-Shields, studies the
effects that mobile crowdsourcing has on conflict prevention and management in
developing countries. Since mobile phone use is becoming increasingly common in
developing countries, Martin-Shields theorizes that mobile phones are able to play a key
role in violence prevention because data and information can be gathered efficiently and
quickly in ways that it never has been in the past.67
Crowdsourced information can assist in the goal of CAC prevention for a variety
of reasons. Foremost, the organizations trying to bring aid and assistance to the conflict
areas will be able to communicate with them and gather valuable information such as
details about LRA hideouts, reports of attacks and/or killings, and LRA sightings. These
communities, which were once closed off from contact with areas outside their
immediate surroundings, would be able to transmit their local knowledge of the activities
of the LRA militia group and pass along information that might prove to be helpful for
predicting where the next attack might take place. Another benefit to collecting
crowdsourced data in these goes back to the theories concerning the benefits of
community-based prevention methods. The citizens in LRA-affected areas could actively
contribute to their own community and family safety through information sharing. They
might also feel a sense of empowerment that would, as authors Macherera and Chimbaria
argue, reduce their vulnerability to attack.68

66. Ibid., 10.
67. Ibid., 7.
68. Macherera and Chimbari, "A Review Of Studies On Community Based Early
Warning Systems", 9.
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Through mobile phone crowdsourcing, third-party actors such as NGOs and
governments, can send and receive information to and from remotely located citizens in
an effort to gather data, prevent violence, and foster peacebuilding. Information reported
from crowdsourced methods flow from the ‘bottom-up,’ allowing the mobile phone user
to send reports in real time to organizations located hundreds or thousands of miles away.
Not only does the user act as a collector of data, but she also serves as an extension of the
organization she is relaying the information to. She can be the proverbial ‘eyes and ears’
of people who cannot physically collect data in those areas. But crowdsourcing data is
only one piece, albeit an important one, in the effort to prevent violence using
technology. The flow of information must also be able to inject data back into the
communities it seeks to serve. For example, in the case of CAC prevention, people could
receive information about the next LRA attack and be able to evacuate before the attack
occurs. This is where early warning systems come into play. These platforms allow a
two-way communication flow that is necessary for predicting and avoiding clandestine
militia attacks, a valuable tactic for communities plagued by LRA raids.
2. c. iii. Early Warning Systems (EWS)
In recent years, humanitarian organizations and governments have been
partnering to address some of the world’s worst disasters through early warning systems.
Many definitions of early warning systems exist, but according to the United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, early warning systems are “set[s] of
capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning
information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard
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to prepare and act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or
loss.”69
Although early warning systems can adapt and change to fit the need of the
hazard presented, the most common systems tend to warn communities about natural
disasters such as floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and landslides while
platforms that address communicable diseases and human conflict are very few.70 Of
these platforms, the systems tend to employ a ‘community-based’ or ‘people-centered’
methodology whereby the affected communities participate in the development of the
system by offering their local knowledge. 71 Authors Macherera and Chimbari define
community-based early warning systems as “one in which the communities participate in
hazard identification and the formulation of the warning system, and not merely reacting
to a warning at local level” thereby creating more opportunities to prevent violence by
allowing locals to create evacuation protocols and security plans to avoid violence.72 This
phenomenon suggests that two-way flows of communication are helpful in eradicating
instances of human violence and brokering peace in remote regions. Drawing on this
newly published research, I will begin to explore how early warning systems and
community-based crowdsourcing can be used in tandem to potentially prevent child
abductions in conflict areas.

69. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR),
"2009 UNISDR Terminology On Disaster Risk Reduction" (repr., Switzerland, 2009),
http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf.
70. Macherera and Chimbari, "A Review Of Studies On Community Based Early
Warning Systems", 9.
71. Ibid., 1.
72. Ibid., 3.

30
The Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015
emphasized a more “people-centered prevention approach to disaster risk” and
encouraged engagement with relevant stakeholders, including citizens, in order to
successfully prepare for encroaching hazards. 73 Here we see a shift in the narrative
surrounding the role of locals. The decades-long rhetoric of villager victimhood is being
replaced by language that suggests that they should engage as critical stakeholders in the
fight against violence in their communities—within the confines of the law they “are
agents of change and should be given the space and modalities to contribute to disaster
risk reduction.”74 Community-based early warning systems are perfect modalities to
engage oppressed or victimized actors because anyone with a phone, regardless of
position, can contribute their knowledge and receive information about potential dangers.
This empowers previously disenfranchised individuals to create change from within
rather than waiting for outside forces to intervene.
The community-based early warning systems are also helpful because they
cultivate awareness, strengthen local capacities, and allow individuals to actively
participate in reducing their vulnerability to hazards.75 Essentially, the platforms afforded
by new technologies give agency to people and empower communities that were once
powerless to stop the reign of terror. These systems are also gaining international
attention as more monitoring and performance evaluations publish statistics marking the

73. United Nations, "Sendai Framework For Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030"
(repr., Sendai, Japan: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015): 10,
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf.
74. Ibid., 22.
75. Ibid., 22.
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increase in effectiveness of community-centered protection programs and early
warning.76 Furthermore, advances in technology contribute to the success of these
programs as they provide the tools necessary for this kind of two-way communication
and collaboration.77 The following chapters will help to explain the context of violence
within the affected communities to better understand the complexities associated with
initiating community-based protection programs, how to best analyze the information
collected from those individuals, and how to harness technology to hopefully bring about
positive change.

3. BACKGROUND & CONFLICT HISTORY
3. a. Understanding the LRA Conflict
Understanding the context in which the LRA conflict came about is extremely
important in the analysis of humanitarian intervention and the prevention methods
employed by stakeholders. As with many events in history, this conflict is multifaceted
and complex. Over the LRA’s long regime of violence, they have been accused of a
litany of human rights abuses such as: the mutilation and summary execution on noncombatants, sexual slavery of women, the conscription of child soldiers, and other war
crimes and crimes against humanity.78 The LRA became infamous for their violent forced
recruitment of children after failing to fill their ranks with adults from the public. In some

76. USAID, "Performance Evaluation And Needs Assessment Report Of USAID
Programming To Communities Affected By The Lord’s Resistance Army In Central
Africa", 2.
77. Ibid., 4.
78 F. Van Acker, "Uganda And The Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No
One Ordered", African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): 335-357, doi:10.1093/afraf/adh044.
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cases children were forced to kill their family members, hack off the limbs of captives, or
for the girls, become the ‘bush wives’ of the commanders and engage in sex acts or
domestic labor.79 Using “psychological warfare” tactics on children, including addicting
them to a drug called brown-brown (a mix of cocaine and smokeless gunpowder), LRA
soldiers were able to conscript 66,000 children in Uganda over the course of the war.80
It has been estimated that by the end of 2003, 1,200,000 civilians were abducted
from their homes and forcibly extricated to live in LRA camps.81 As tensions grew in the
region and LRA incidents made their way into the headlines of newspapers around the
world, global outraged spawned reaction from governments near and far. Tales of the
tragedy being inflicted in northern Uganda caught the attention of world leaders including
the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan who coordinated U.N. efforts in an attempt to
quell the violence.82 Pressure mounted on the militants as the U. S. State Department
classified the LRA as a terrorist organization and passed the Northern Uganda Crisis
Response Act to end the crisis. 83 In 2006, feeling the rising pressure from the U.N. and
the U.S. ground troops, the LRA retreated from Uganda into the safety of west
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) border region and Central African Republic
(CAR) where they remain in hiding today.84 In these heavily forested areas, the LRA can

79. "The LRA Crisis | Basic History", The Resolve, 2010,
http://www.theresolve.org/the-lra-crisis/basic-history/.
80. Ibid.
81. Van Acker, "Uganda And The Lord's Resistance Army", 336.
82. Paul Raffaele, "Uganda: The Horror", Smithsonianmag.com, 2005,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/uganda-the-horror-85439313/.
83. "Northern Uganda Crisis Response Act", PUBLIC LAW 108–283 § (2004).
84. "COUNTER - Lord's Resistance Army (C-LRA) | Central Africa Regional |
Archive - U.S. Agency For International Development", 2012-2017.Usaid.Gov, 2017,
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remain hidden by the vegetation which allows them to continue their operations while
maintaining a low-profile. Even though their forces have reduced in numbers with the
various efforts by the DRC and CAR militaries, the LRA continues to wreak havoc
“against local communities on a regular basis” throughout these two regions.85 These
areas are susceptible to LRA attacks due to weak or ineffectual governments, limited
humanitarian presence, and rugged landscapes which easily conceal militia hideouts and
camps.86
The ethnic tensions spurred by years of oppression, brutality, torture, and murder
of civilians under previously dictatorships, as well as economic instability, paved the way
for this radical militia groups to form and flourish. 87 The unique factors that allow this
violence to persist in this area of Sub-Saharan Africa explain why some of the
interventions have not been successful while others have, and how some current methods
can be improved to build capacity with the aim of ending the violence. The following
section provides a ‘real-world’ example of how one organization has brought these
theories into practice in an effort to thwart LRA abductions in these regions.
3. b. Invisible Children & the Kony Campaign
Founded in 2004, Uganda-based NGO Invisible Children operates with the
mission of eradicating the Kony-led LRA forces that continue to target communities in
DRC and south CAR. With a focus on child protection in particular, Invisible Children

https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/central-africa-regional/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-counterlord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army-c-lra.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Paul Ronan, "Inside The LRA", Theresolve.Org, 2017,
http://www.theresolve.org/2017/01/the-closing-of-the-resolve-lra-crisis-initiative-andwhats-next.
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launched a global campaign dubbed ‘Kony 2012’ to inform the world about the horrific
acts the LRA was inflicting upon children. The documentary went viral and people across
the world stood united with Invisible Children’s mission to save children from the horrors
of conscripted soldiering. According to their website, Invisible Children “mobilized
unprecedented international awareness and action to help end the LRA crisis, contributed
to a 93% reduction in killings by the LRA, and…have helped thousands of central
African families become safer through innovative community-based protection
initiatives.”88 Although these numbers cannot be corroborated with sources other than
what is presented by the NGO themselves, the Kony campaign has been cited by the
media as having, for example, a “profound impact on U.S. policy toward the LRA crisis,
most notably the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and the decision
to send U.S. military advisers to the region to assist Ugandan military forces hunting for
Kony.”89 It was also reported that Invisible Children’s mission coincided with “public
policy priorities of the Obama administration (such as the prevention of mass atrocities
and conflict prevention and regional security cooperation in Africa)” that lead to a closer
collaboration between the U.S. government and the NGO.90 Whether or not the success of
the Kony campaign can be verified in the field, it is evident that the national attention
sparked by this viral movement directed more U.S. attention to the ongoing crisis and

88. "Our Story | Invisible Children", Invisible Children, 2014,
https://invisiblechildren.com/our-story/.
89. Kristof Titeca and Matthew Sebastian, "Why Did Invisible Children
Dissolve?", Washington Post, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-dissolve/?utm_term=.5cf8f92e9adf.
90. Ibid.
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provided opportunities for the development of more innovative ways to combat the
relentless attacks by the LRA.
3. b. i. Invisible Children’s Community-based Protection Initiatives
With cooperation with the U.S. government, Invisible Children launched several
community-based protection initiatives after their Kony campaign to expand their reach
into remote, LRA-affected communities. These included a ‘Come Home’ LRA Defection
Messaging System, an LRA Crisis Tracker, and an Early Warning Radio Network. The
‘Come Home’ program sends an FM broadcasted message to LRA soldiers encouraging
them to leave the group and return home. 91 The hope is that soldiers will understand that
there are more options than continuing the life they have been leading.
Invisible Children also partnered with another NGO to establish the LRA Crisis
Tracker, a crisis-mapping social web platform that broadcasts the attacks and other
activities perpetrated by the LRA in near real time.92 This dynamic and publicly available
mapping tool allows users to better understand the urgency of the LRA crisis and to what
extent the group is affecting the local communities. The LRA Crisis Tracker uses
information gathered from the UN, partner organizations, local NGOs, and first-hand
reports captured by the Early Warning Radio Network.
This Radio Network was Invisible Children’s response to the problem of
inaccessibility and lack of communication with remote and isolated villages. The
Network was designed to disrupt the patterns of violence by collecting first-hand
information from trained Community Observers, vetting the information for accuracy,

91. Invisible Children.
92. Ibid.
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and disseminating warnings concerning the location of the LRA using high-frequency
(HF), long-range, two-way radios. Presently, there are 74 HF radios in 78 communities in
the DRC and CAR that allow Community Observers to receive twice-daily security
briefings about LRA activity, including potential life-saving information about the
likelihood of a village raid. 93 The information that the Community Observers are
responsible for gathering and reporting are incidents such as “civilian death and injury,
abduction, looting, displacement, and the release or escape of formerly abducted
persons.”94 The hope with this community-based program is that the citizens in LRAaffected areas will feel empowered to protect their families against potential raids or
attacks. This idea is commensurate with the burgeoning theories on Information
Communication Technology suggesting that tech-based humanitarian initiatives are more
likely to prevent conflict if the citizens function as agents of change rather than merely
the bystanders of atrocities committed around them.95
Below I have highlighted some of the main issues with the current methods and
proffered some potential solutions.

CURRENT ISSUES:
• The current method relies on High-Frequency radios, which is not efficient. The
radios break often, need to be replaced, are expensive, and do not offer
consistently clear transmissions so communication is difficult.

93. Ibid.
94. Invisible Children + Resolve LRA Crisis Tracker Database, "LRA Crisis
Tracker: MAP METHODOLOGY & DATABASE CODEBOOK V2a" (repr.,
Washington D. C., 2015), http://www.theresolve.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MapMethodology-and-Database-Codebook-v2-2015.pdf.
95. United Nations, "Sendai Framework For Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030".
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• The Community Observers are the only ones who can report on incidents and they
have to be identified and trained which takes times and money.
• The current network can only operate in certain (pre-selected) villages, leaving
members of other communities to feel disempowered or forgotten.
• Once the information is received from the Community Observer, he must relay
the warning of encroaching danger to hundreds or even thousands of people,
which can be difficult for just one person to achieve.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:
• Increase the accessibility to the network by opening communication through
mobile phones, which many people own.
• All people with a mobile phone can send and receive information so no
community feels disempowered or forgotten.
• The service is free to the user and anonymous, so they can feel safe reporting
information.
• Communities can create disaster response evacuation plans to prevent or reduce
fatalities and child abductions. This gives the people themselves the ability to
protect themselves
versus relying on external assistance.
The following section will further rationalize why I chose these solutions and explain
how these changes might help to expand the scope of safety to villages afflicted by
militia raids.
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4. PROJECT METHODOLOGY & RATIONALE

“Technology is nothing. What’s important is that you have a faith in
people, that they’re basically good and smart, and if you give them
tools, they’ll do wonderful things with them.”
– Steve Jobs,
Former Chairman, Chief Executive Officer,
and Co-founder of Apple Inc.

“We believe that if marginalized people are able to easily communicate
to those who aim to serve them, then those organizations and
governments can more effectively respond to their communities'
immediate needs while simultaneously bringing global attention to
their problems through the aggregation of their voices.”
– Ushahidi mission statement,
Open-source humanitarian software used for crisis response,
human rights reporting, and election monitoring

4. a. The AuCourant Early Warning Network
Founded in theories suggesting that community-based early warning systems are
useful methods for preparing citizens to protect against violence, I developed a platform
that increases the efficiency of Invisible Children’s Radio Early Warning Network by
integrating SMS text messaging as a tool for data capture. My platform is named ‘Au
Courant,’ which means ‘well informed’ in French, the national language of the DRC and
CAR. This phrase can also mean ‘current,’ which connotes the flow of information that
this platform hopes to achieve. I created this mobile phone crowdsourcing platform with
the intent of improving some of problems posed by IC’s network which relies solely on
communication from HF radios.
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The way the platform works is simple: it allows any mobile phone user in DRC or
CAR to text a short code96 number if they spot LRA militia members or any militiarelated activity. As the platform is built using interactive SMS (iSMS) technology, the
user will be able to have a text ‘conversation’ and pre-programmed messages will be
automatically sent depending on the user’s responses. As soon as the first text is sent, the
user will receive an automated response welcoming them to the network and asking for
certain information to be included in the message such as where the sighting occurred,
the time and date, and location of the incident. This information is similar to what the
Invisible Children Community Observers are trained to capture and report. However, this
method, unlike IC, is available to thousands more witnesses in these LRA-affected
communities.
The AuCourant iSMS system is free of charge for users, anonymous, simple to
use on any basic mobile phone device, and does not require the internet. Also, the user
does not have to be located within a cell service area to send a text. They would simply
hit ‘send’ and then as soon as the mobile phone enters a service area, the text is
automatically pushed through. This technology enables users in the most remote areas of
the DRC and CAR to effectively communicate vital information about the LRA and other
militia groups whereabouts. The scope of communication is widened with the
introduction of this platform because anyone would be able to contribute to their
knowledge in the effort to stop attacks.

96. "Short Code", En.Wikipedia.Org, 2018,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_code. Short codes, or short numbers, are short digit
sequences, significantly shorter than telephone numbers, that are used to address
messages in the Multimedia Messaging System (MMS) and short message service (SMS)
systems of mobile network operators.

40
Information gathering (crowdsourcing), however, is only half of the strategy. The
other part relies on two-way communication, meaning that anyone who sends information
can also opt-in to receive alerts. The platform is built so that users will be asked if they
want to subscribe to receive information from Invisible Children about potential LRA
attacks and raids. If they opt-in, their phone numbers will be sorted into a database that
Invisible Children can then use to send a mass text message with information that they
deem credible and pertinent.
As with their current system, IC will have the task of vetting the information they
receive from this network for accuracy. The threshold of receiving inaccurate, false, or
misleading data will be much higher once the network allows for any person to submit
information—not just the highly-trained and trusted Community Observers. Although
this particular project does not go into explicit detail about how to efficiently analyze the
data, there are many software programs available to NGOs to assist in quick data analysis
using algorithms and mathematics to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ information.97
I will discuss more about the potential risks of verifying crowdsourced data in the
subsequent sections. Another potential roadblock I will examine is how to communicate
the existence of this platform in an easy-to-understand way, across multiple languages,
and through a variety of cultural lenses to all mobile-phone holding citizens in LRAaffected communities in the DRC and CAR. But first, I would like to explain why—if
this method has such potential for positive change—it has not been implemented by
Invisible Children already.

97. Anwaar Ali et al., "Big Data For Development: Applications And
Techniques", Big Data Analytics 1, no. 1 (2016), 1-24. doi:10.1186/s41044-016-0002-4.
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There are now enough mobile phone users to be able to provide consistent
information to Invisible Children and potentially other humanitarian organizations
seeking to prevent child abductions. The platform is designed so that it is replicable,
scalable, translatable to other fields. It is my hope that this platform will be integrated
with the Invisible Children early warning system to increase the efficiency and scope of
the network with the goal of preparing these communities to better handle the threat of
violence imposed by the LRA militia raids.
4. b. Case Study Comparison & Rationale
To better understand some of the strengths my platform, the potential ease of
replication, and to identify potential weaknesses, I conducted a case study comparison
between similar community initiatives that have been deployed in other developing
countries that utilize SMS-based early warning systems. In an effort to create an effective
product for ending child abductions in this region of Africa, I analyzed monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) reports for six of the largest and most applicable community-based,
mobile phone platforms for conflict prevention and peace building: I Paid A Bribe; ABA
ROLI Early Warning and Response System; Counter - Lord's Resistance Army Early
Warning System (C-LRA EWS); IPDU/P4P SMS Early Warning Early Response
(EWER); and Belun Early Warning Early Response (EWER) (see Appendix 2). These
M&E reports provided useful information on what aspects of these programs are working
well and what improvements need to be made in order to achieve the desired impact.
Although these systems are diverse and range from anti-corruption and ending sexual
abuse impunity, they are all relatively similar in their methodologies—most notably
through the use of citizens to engage where they previously could not. Below, I will
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examine some of these platforms’ strengths and weaknesses to provide rationale for why
I chose the methodologies used in the AuCourant system.
4. b. i. Analysis
I Paid A Bribe, which operates in India, is the world’s largest online crowdsourced anti-corruption platform.98 This system claims to “tackle corruption by
harnessing the collective energy of citizens…[by] collect[ing] bribe reports, and
build[ing] a repository of corruption-related data across government departments.”99 The
data collected on bribe reports from anonymous users allows advocacy groups to reveal
flaws in governance procedures and campaigns for tighter law enforcement and
regulation thereby “reducing the scope for corruption.”100 Although widely praised for its
ability to raise awareness of governmental corruption, I Paid A Bribe has run into a few
issues such as difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of the platform (essentially it is
hard to measure changes in the behavior of government officials) and how to generate
and sustain interest in the platform since it is being funded mainly by a single entity.101
We can learn from this model by developing AuCourant to run sustainably
through partnerships with funding agencies and other non-profits. Catholic Relief
Services which operates out of Uganda is well-known for funding similar projects that
seek to end violence inflicted by the LRA. I would recommend that the AuCourant

98. "I Paid A Bribe", ipaidabribe.com, accessed 29 January 2018,
http://www.ipaidabribe.com/.
99. Janaagraha, "Janaagraha Centre For Citizenship And Democracy Report", Q1
April 2011- June 2011, 2012: 1-21. http://janaagraha.org/files/Janaagraha-Q1-2011-12report-fin.pdf.
100 Ibid., 5.
101. Karthik Ramanna and Rachna Tahilyani, "I Paid A Bribe (Dot)
Com", Harvard Business Schoolno. 112-078 (2014),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=42758.
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implementing organization seek funding from CRS and establish a partnership to ensure
future financial sustainability. Although I Paid A Bribe is hard to evaluate because
corruption is a more abstract threat than the physical violence carried out by the LRA
militia, the main takeaway is that an emphasis should be placed on installing proper
evaluation methods to measure the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the AuCourant
system once it is in place. M&E reports conducted by third-party field monitors will
provide invaluable feedback as to the effect this system will be having on the
communities in which it operates. We will be able to assess the positive or negative
outcomes as a result of the crowdsourced data and alter the platform and processes as
necessary to create a better system.
There are also lessons to be learned from similar platforms that currently operate
in DRC which have similar aims of seeking to end the violence caused by the LRA. The
American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative created an Early Warning and
Response System (ROLI EWRS) as a way to bring justice to remote communities
affected by the LRA. This initiative provides innovative mobile courts which allow
victims to have their testimonies heard and also provides judicial scholarships to female
law students.102 Similar to AuCourant, this platform gathers data on LRA incidents and
sends alerts to communities when there is a perceived threat; however, ROLI EWRS has
a couple major weaknesses that undermine its mission. This system relies solely on data
gathered from trained Community Observers that live in 30 villages throughout the DRC.

102. "Democratic Republic Of Congo | Rule Of Law Initiative",
Americanbar.Org, 2018,
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/africa/democratic_r
epublic_congo.html.

44
Instead of crowdsourcing information from civilians, ROLI EWRS relies on the small
amount of information gathered from these Community Observers alone. In addition to
the limited number of people submitting information to the network, there is also the
issue of limited scope. These are the only 30 people who are responsible for alerting
thousands of civilians about a potential raid when they receive an alert. This slows the
process of evacuation and puts the community at a disadvantage. And finally, ABA ROLI
works closely with the Congolese police force, providing them with all of the information
gathered from the Community Observers. 103 The Congolese police force and national
army in the DRC have been accused of grave violations against children and corruption,
making them unreliable partners in the effort to combat the LRA. 104 AuCourant will have
a much wider scope and range since it will open access to all mobile phone users instead
of a small number of Community Observers. AuCourant will also house the
crowdsourced data within the confines of the partner organization and will not grant
access to potentially corrupt government or police entities.
Another initiative that seeks to end LRA child abductions is the USAID-run
platform called Counter-LRA Early Warning System (C-LRA EWS). Although this
program offers valuable assistance to LRA-affected communities in DRC and CAR, such
as trauma healing workshops for survivors and victims, this platform again falls short of
scope as it only uses a limited number of high-frequency radios and volunteer Conflict

103. Ibid.
104. "DR Congo Corruption Report", Business-Anti-Corruption.com, 2016,
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/democratic-republic-of-thecongo; Alex Fielding, "Corruption, Violence Threaten Congo’s Foreign Aid And
Investment", IPI Global Observatory, 2017,
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/07/congo-drc-corruption-kabila-aid/.
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Monitors to gather information and disseminate warnings. 105 And arguably even more
discouraging is the fact that U.S. government money is being funneled into this program,
and along with it, political consequences. A 2015 congressional report questions whether
U.S. fiscal support may have “unintended consequences for U.S. policy and the region”
and “may also impede U.S. diplomatic leverage with regard to criticizing Uganda’s
record on democracy, governance, and human rights.”106 It is for this reason that
AuCourant would only be implemented by a non-governmental agency—to avoid the
politics that go hand-in-hand with managing government funded programs.
There are also lessons to be learned from reading M&E reports on the last two
early warning and response programs: IPDU/P4P SMS Early Warning Early Response
(EWER) and Belun Early Warning Early Response (EWER). Although these programs
operate in Nigeria and Timor-Leste, respectively, the evaluations provide some
interesting perspective on the pros and cons of conflict prevention using mobile phone
technology. Unlike the previously discussed initiatives, these platforms do engage with
the community by allowing individuals to submit information via text messaging. There
has been proven success with this kind of community engagement and empowerment.
For instance, between April to June 2016, over 160 incidents were reported to the IPDU
SMS Platform, allowing law enforcement officials to follow up on reports of violence
and protect citizens.107 However, here we see the same issue as the C-LRA EWS system

105. "COUNTER - Lord's Resistance Army".
106. Congressional Research Service, "The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S.
Response", 18 (repr., CRS, 2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42094.pdf.
107. Michael Olufemi Sodipo, "Early Warning And Early Response For
Peacebuilding In Nigeria", Peace Insight, 2014.
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as the IPDU platform also partners with local law enforcement and government forces. In
Nigeria, some have suggested that the IPDU system is “weak and inadequate” due to a
lack of coordination between policymakers, civil society, government forces, law
enforcement, and local actors.108 By limiting partnerships to one or two organizations, the
AuCourant network will have more control over processes and will hopefully have a
more organized directive.
Evaluations of the Belun EWER platform raise concerns about a lack of resources
to tackle the threats. Although there have been thousands of reported incidents since its
launch in 2009, the Belun team “can barely scratch the surface of conflict resolution” due
to a lack of internal resources and weak organization capacity.109 This is something that
should be taken into consideration for the success of AuCourant. Also, the Belun EWER
system faced issues with lack of awareness among senior officials about their program. 110
An evaluation of the program recommended that the team ensures that there is an
“effective role for civil society in security sector monitoring and accountability
systems.”111 Most importantly, AuCourant must ensure that all team members are fully
trained on all aspects of the platform, its technical shortcomings and complexities, and
how to engage its users so that the most positive outcome can be realized.

108. Ibid.
109 Freya Shaw, "Early Warning, Early Response In Timor-Leste", Peace Insight,
2015, https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2015/08/early-warning-early-response-in-timorleste/.
110. United States Agency for International Development & United States
Department of State, "Evaluation Of The U.S. Mission To Timor-Leste’s 1207 Program,
“Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace”", (repr., Washington, D.C., 2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257544.pdf.
111. Ibid., 13.
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As shown, technology-driven conflict and corruption prevention initiatives are
multi-faceted and complex. As with any humanitarian or advocacy mission, the
individuals operating the AuCourant network must put forth extreme diligence and
critical consideration in all aspects of this program in order to protect citizens and prevent
child abductions. Hopefully these case studies illuminated some of the most important
aspects for consideration in the deployment of this cutting-edge conflict prevention
system. Now, I turn to the technological elements of the platform that will give
individuals living in remote areas of the DRC and CAR the agency they desire and
deserve.

5. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
5. a. Technical Interface
After I selected the qualitative methodologies for the platform based on case study
comparisons, the next challenge was to choose a technology interface that would allow
this methodology to be fully realized. I found that although technologically-driven
conflict prevention is a relatively new field, hundreds of previously created systems could
simply be modified to meet the needs of this burgeoning industry. The same text
messaging platforms that are used by school districts in Minnesota to alerts parents about
snow days can be easily adjusted to allow for healthcare professionals in Sierra Leone to
alert villagers about possible malaria outbreaks. As the market for these technologies
expands to the realm of conflict prevention, the companies behind their creation are
suddenly becoming very competitive and accessible to once-untapped clients such as
national governments, humanitarian organizations, healthcare agencies, and NGOs.
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Therefore, it was relatively simple to research the most widely used text messaging
platforms and compare the benefits of each system to determine the one I ultimately
selected.
There are two routes to go when thinking about which type of technology to use:
a basic, interactive SMS text-messaging platform or a more robust disaster management
software. The advantages of disaster management software, such as Ushahidi, InSTEDD,
and Sahana, are that more specific data can be collected to address large-scale violence
like civil war, election fraud, and natural disasters. These programs use GPS-location
technology and can interface with other systems so that information is streamlined from
one platform to another. There are also other benefits in the way of data visualization—
the software can easily plot records on a map and show the user where incidents are
occurring or being reported at a glance. Despite these advantages, I did not select this
type of software because I felt that the technology was too complex and unnecessarily
robust for my goal of gathering crowdsourced data and disseminating alerts to
individuals. Also, the monthly cost for these types of platforms were much higher than
the systems offering SMS services alone. Therefore, I chose to build my data collection
platform with an SMS service.
My initial research on SMS platforms specifically tailored for international
development yielded these three products: Frontline SMS, Open Data Kit, and Magpi. All
three products were either open source, meaning it is publicly available and free for all
users, or they provided a free version that would meet the needs of AuCourant. I quickly
eliminated Frontline SMS because it did not offer text services outside of the US and
Canada. Open Data Kit seemed like an excellent choice, however, the product only runs
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on Android phones and I wanted the systems to be more accessible to users of all mobile
phone types. Magpi was the clear winner as it offers advanced mobile data, messaging,
and visualization on any mobile device in the world. The other benefits for selecting this
product are as follows:
•

The ‘interactive’ SMS (or iSMS) technology allows for two-way
communication with a user and a form design allows for different
responses depending on user input.

•

It can send SMS messages to multiple users from a web-based
platform

•

A short code allows users to initiate text sessions without being
prompted (thus, allowing for crowdsourcing)

•

Critical data can be fed into SQL databases, Salesforce accounts,
Google spreadsheets, or almost any other web-accessible system

•

There is an app-based feature that can run on iOS, Android, and
Symbian phones and tablets

•

Voice based (IVR) technology allows users to speak into their phones
instead of typing—thereby connecting with even illiterate populations

•

And a text message can be sent outside of service areas and will be
pushed through as soon as the mobile user regains service allowing
this service to operate well in remote areas of the world that lack
abundant telecom infrastructure112

I have also read several case studies which illustrated the multifaceted uses for
this software in development work such as responding to disease outbreaks, helping
predict natural disasters, and monitoring human rights abuses in developing countries.
And due to the sensitive nature of the data collection for some of these use-cases, Magpi

112. "SMS Data Collection - Magpi", Magpi, 2018,
https://home.magpi.com/solutions/sms-data-collection/.
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ensures the security of the information collected through modern full-device encryption
methods using a robust security profile. Therefore, I decided to use the Magpi software to
carry out the AuCourant messaging system.
Though I have previously described in detail the weaknesses of other systems in
both the qualitative and technical senses—and how AuCourant will attempt to avoid
making similar mistakes, there are some obvious potential limitations and risks of this
system that are unavoidable given the nature of its function. Below I will delve into the
most important areas for consideration. Specifically, I will cover how AuCourant will
attempt to mitigate issues with data verification, spreading awareness about the program,
the platform’s intent, and how it will communicate with users about safety.
5. b. Data Verification
The ubiquity of mobile telephony on the global landscape has paved the way for
new modes of peacebuilding, security, and conflict prevention in remotes areas of the
world. The use of technology is becoming increasingly more common in the field of
development as it allows for more data to be efficiently collected and disseminated.
However, this data is only as good as it is factual. The information sourced from the
communities using AuCourant will need to be thoroughly evaluated in order for the
platform to be effective in raid prediction. What if there are false reports of attacks sent in
by users in an attempt to undermine the effort? What is LRA members themselves send
in false information as a way to redirect attention away from them? What if witnesses
submit information accidentally or provide a completely inaccurate account? In
crowdsourcing, there are always many possible avenues for erroneous data.
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There are several methods to verify the validity of the crowdsourced data
including but not limited to: digital algorithms which sort and filter data; comparison
with media to cross-reference incidents that were reported on; local Field Monitors who
enter communities and corroborate reports with residents and possible witnesses; using
GPS stamps to cluster incidents in order to ascertain patterns and sort out unverified
reports. Although there are many pros and cons to all of these methods, I recommend
implementing as many of them as possible to procure the most accurate and least-biased
data as possible. And though this study does not delve into the mechanics of these
methods, I would also recommend that the implementing agency places a high emphasis
on digital algorithms which use smart machine computing methods to parse out the
“actionable knowledge” (true information) from false data. 113 Several experts in the field
of artificial intelligence and machine learning have lauded the ability of these
applications to successfully produce indicators from big data sets that assist in
development—such as in humanitarian crises and violence conflicts.114 As the AuCourant
system gathers more data as it expands into other communities, it will become even more
important to install data verification systems that accurately vet the information being
collected for the safety of the citizens.
It should be noted that the feasibility of using machine learning programs to
anticipate the likelihood of raids may be low. In terms of cost, time, and personnel, this
may not be within the scope of reality for NGOs operating on tight budgets—as they
often are. It is realistic, however, to anticipate that the accessibility of such programs will

113. Anwaar Ali et al., "Big Data For Development: Applications And
Techniques".
114. Ibid., 2.
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become more available in the future as industries continue to pursue this technology as
more practical uses emerge. It is also plausible that more money in the future might be
earmarked for the installation of technological applications in the non-profit world as
these systems become better at problem-solving and more cost-effective than human
performance alone.
5. c. Awareness, Intent, & Safety
I foresee the most evident initial hurdle in this implementation being how to
properly inform the communities about the conceptual and logistical realities of
AuCourant. The first issue is how to effectively communicate the AuCourant short code,
the system’s main objective, and what the user should across many cultural, linguistic,
and situational barriers. I have worked with a skilled graphic designer to create a few
mock-ups of potential advertisements that could be made into physical posters or used in
billboards (see Appendix 1.e.). The main objective with these posters is to have a visual
impact that will be able to communicate to the user that this is a text-message based
initiative used to anonymously report LRA activity in order to stop the forced
conscription of children. We included the ‘down the barrel of the gun’ aesthetic and
silhouette of a child soldier enshrouded in red to communicate to even an illiterate
audience that the nature of AuCourant concentrates on CAC. The ad mockup is currently
in English but if and when the system is deployed in CAR and DRC, the copy would be
translated into French and some of the main local dialects such as Kiswahili, Sango, and
the Bantu language Lingala. The ad clearly states that community members should text
282-687 to report any LRA activity they witness and include the date, time, and any other
pertinent information. It also communicates that the user can choose to voluntarily enroll
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in a subscription service to receive texts about LRA activity or perceived threats in their
area. The target population can also be reached via radio advertisements, community
billboards, paper handouts in villages, and TV advertisements, to name a few.
Although it is important to properly convey what AuCourant is, it is arguably
more important to communicate to users what is is not. It will be crucial to the success of
the program, and the safety of the community, to ensure that we communicate to the
public that this is not a 911 service. Users should be fully aware that they are simply
contributing data that will help the experts predict outbreaks of violence, but that citizens
should not rely on receiving an alert notification. As with any conflict, there will be
surprise attacks and unplanned raids that AuCourant will not be able to detect. It is also
vital that the user understands that no emergency services nor police will be deployed
when an alert is sent. The purpose of the alert is to trigger community members to follow
through with a predetermined evacuation plan or whatever protocol the village leaders
decide. We can learn from past mistakes made with the Ushahidi program where users
expected a response when a notification was sent. The following excerpt comes from a
TechChange article warning of the perils of mobile phone technology in conflict
prevention:
There were cases where people thought that sending a text to Ushahidi
was like calling 911. They expected that if their text showed up on a map,
then help would come,” said Dr. Levinger. It’s incumbent on outsiders to
make it clear what their technology’s purpose is and what its limits are.
This is important in the best of circumstances, but in an emergency it can
be the difference between life and death.115

115. Charles Shields, "Power To The People: The Risk And Rewards Of Mobile
Technology In Governance Development", Blog, Techchange, 2011,
https://www.techchange.org/2011/04/21/power-to-the-people-the-risk-and-rewards-ofmobile-technology-in-governance-development.
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With this in mind, proper attention must be given to effectively communicate
AuCourant’s conceptual intent and purpose to the public through the ad campaigns. The
ads will also inform the user that the program is free and anonymous to use but that does
not mean there are no risks. For instance, if the user subscribes to the service, they will
receive a text notification which may sound on phones at the same time as other
subscribers—an observer may be able to connect the dots that the user was subscribed
and that they are receiving alerts. This is one of many potential indicators that a user has
subscribed, and that may prove to be dangerous depending on the situation. This is a
threat that the user must understand before they engage with the platform.
5. d. Other Limitations & Risks
The overseeing body of AuCourant, be it Invisible Children or another
organization, will have challenges to overcome if this system is to work effectively to
prevent child abductions. With any newly implemented technology, there are certain
unique challenges that must be addressed in order for the system to carry out the specific
function for which it was created. However, the precarious nature of the threat that this
system seeks to eradicate—an unstable, child-abducting armed militia—should not be
understated. The kind of information being disseminated through AuCourant has
powerful implications—both for transformative social improvement but also for
potentially dangerous effects on the community in which it operates unless special care
and diligent thought are put into the management of this system. In the previous sections
I have attempted to predict a few of the most critical aspects of this system that are
potential areas of weakness, risks, or possible limitations in the implementation of
AuCourant—however it is by no means an exhaustive list of the potential risks. I believe
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the most prudent process for unrolling this platform would be in a small beta-test in two
villages in DRC and CAR, respectively, to monitor the strengths and weakness on small
scale before it is deployed country-wide.
5. e. Beta-Testing
It is always a good idea to launch a small-scale version of a project, beta-test, to
receive feedback that could be useful in altering the platform before resources are used to
implement the full-scale platform. Not only is beta-testing useful for altering the
technical aspects of the platform, it is also crucial for receiving feedback from the
community in which it will be released. Perhaps there is some aspect that was overlooked
in the development stages—this is the opportunity to fix those bugs before the project
goes live to thousands of people. And the detailed feedback from the users of the product
will be helpful for tweaking aspects of the product that do not make sense for users. It is
ultimately a chance to refine the platform before launching in the hopes of maximizing its
ultimate success.
Beta-testing the AuCourant platform could be achieved by deploying the program
in two villages in DRC and CAR prior to rolling out the system to millions of people.
Information on which two communities to choose could best be answered by local actors,
therefore I will not presume to know where this system should be piloted. However, it
should be assumed that these two areas are LRA-affected and have proven mobile phone
users to make it an effective trial. Ad campaigns should be presented in these
communities and the data collected should be thoroughly monitored for accuracy. After a
period of three to six months, M&E specialists should conduct full reports on the
effectiveness of the ads, ability for the system to function, and other limitations or
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successes. This information will be paramount to the success of the program when it is
launched on a large scale across DRC and CAR.
6. CONCLUSION
If judiciously executed, the AuCourant platform has the ability to provide lifechanging outcomes for individuals who had never been able to demonstrate agency in the
past. For those parents of children in LRA-affected areas of the DRC and CAR, the
power of protection may literally exist in their pocket—by harnessing the far-reaching
power of mobile phone SMS technology, the AuCourant network could transform the
landscape from one to violence to one of peace. The balance of power which currently
resides with the LRA could shift to the residents, emboldening them with the ability to
save themselves and their children from a lifetime of trauma and bloodshed.
However, as with any idea that asserts life-changing results, it should be
cautioned that this is not a silver bullet. This is simply one suggestion for making a
current system more effective in the fight against the use of children in combat. Dr. Raul
Zambrano of the United Nations Development Program and Dr. Matthew Levinger from
the U.S. Institute of Peace eloquently assert that “the challenges faced by development
and peace-making professionals can only be solved by human ingenuity, social awareness
and ethics. Mobile technology is only a means to more efficiently achieving this end.”116
If humanitarians, governments, and child rights advocates are serious about changing the
tide of abuse and abduction in these countries, they cannot solely rely on technology to
make this change; it will require the dedication, hard work, and perseverance of these

116. Shields, "Power To The People".
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impassioned individuals to see that this technology fulfills the transformation they so
desire.
I cannot help but think back to my few weeks in that Uganda refugee camp where
my initial desire to help originated. Although I am realistic about the barriers facing this
kind of innovative method, I am also extremely hopeful and motivated by the potential
this project possesses. This platform has far-reaching capabilities to transform
communities in areas of the world that have been ‘forgotten’ or are so remote that
collaboration with outside assistance is difficult. It also gives the power back to the
individuals who were previously regarded as only victims; now they will have the agency
to fight back against the violence by being more prepared for when disaster strikes.
Knowledge is power—and this power has the potential to improve the lives of millions
and most importantly, the lives of the next generation.
I was recently approached by a Congolese citizen studying in the United States
about my work on this platform. He confided that his own life was saved when he was
alerted about an incoming militia raid on his village before it happened. He was warned
about the impending raid through a ‘traditional’ method where a scout would perch on a
hilltop and if he spotted danger, he would yell and pound on drums to signal incoming
danger to the villagers below. He also disclosed to me that he was excited about the
potential impact of my platform and, in his personal opinion, thought that it would work
well to save lives in DRC.
Whether or not this platform is implemented in the field, I will continue to ‘sound
the drums,’ so-to-speak, and do whatever is in my ability to prevent the needless
suffering of children in the future. I am honored by those who bravely shared their stories
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with me, humbled by the fierce determination of the survivors, and driven by my promise
to bring hope to an area ravaged by decades of brutality. I am very grateful that I have
had the opportunity to contribute to the research on this topic and provide my idea to the
growing movement of advocates fighting to keep children safe from the dangers of armed
conflict around the world.
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2. CASE STUDY COMPARISON CHART
Program Name

I Paid A Bribe

Implementing Stakeholder(s)
Agency
/Partners

Janaagraha

OECD
Development
Assistance
Committee

Threat

Government
Corruption

Geographic
Region

India

Methodology

• Largest online crowd-sourced • Data on corruption builds awareness and
anti- corruption platform in the shame, raising the cost of corruption.
world today
• Leaverages technology to decrease
• Crowd-sourcing model to
corruption in government.
collect bribe reports

American Bar
Congolese
Association,
Rape/Serious
Police and
Rule of Law
Crimes
National Army
Initiative (ROLI)

DRC

• Scholarship and externship
opportunities for female law
students

Weaknesses
• Difficult to measure effectiveness of
platform (behavior changes).
• After initial successes in 2011, traffic to
the website has slowed.
• How to generate and sustain interest in
the web platform so that they have real
impact on corruption in India.

• Repository of corruptionrelated data across government
departments
• Free legal aid and mobile
courts to meet the needs of
those in remote areas

ABA ROLI Early
Warning and
Response
System

Strengths

• Helps to build the justice system’s ability to • Information routed directly to
manage, analyze and use data to improve the Congolese police force and national army
delivery of justice.
which have been accused of grave
violations against children and corruption.
• Uses simple yet powerful technology to
increase access to justice, connect the various
actors within the justice system to avert
violence.
• Empowers community leaders to advocate
on behalf of communities affected by largescale mining.

• Communities use high
frequency radios and other
technologies to report LRA
activities and exchange critical
information enabling them to
reduce their exposure to attack

Counter - Lord's
Resistance
Army Early
Warning
System (C-LRA
EWS)

USAID

Catholic Relief
LRA
Services
Attacks/Raids

• Over 281,000 beneficiaries in CAR and DRC. • Only 30 members have ability to
send/receive texts.
• Formed 94 community protection
committees (32 in CAR, 62 in DRC) that help • Some might question whether ongoing
local populations mitigate the impacts of
U.S. support to the Ugandan military is
attacks.
having unintended consequences for U.S.
policy and the region, for example in
• Communities can organize
• Operates high-frequency radios in 38
relation to Uganda’s military role in the
their own protection plans and communities in CAR and 62 communities in internal conflict in South Sudan.
Northeast DRC
provides trauma- healing
DRC using solar panels to expand
& CAR
support for survivors of LRA
dissemination of information on LRA attacks. • The U.S. security partnership with the
attacks
UPDF may also impede U.S. diplomatic
• Held more than 123 trauma healing
leverage with regard to criticizing
workshops in the DRC and CAR.
Uganda’s record on democracy,
governance, and human rights.
• Trained 538 volunteer conflict monitors
across Northern Uganda.

Partnership

IPDU/P4P SMS Initiative in the
Niger Delta
Early Warning
(IPDU);
Early Response
Partners4Peace
(EWER)
(P4P); The Fund

Law
enforcement
agencies

Conflict
Management
and Peacebuilding

Niger Delta
Region

• SMS-Based Early Warning &
Response System and peace
messaging online platform
collects, collates and analyzes
conflict incidents and aids law
enforcement agencies

• Enables PREVENT Committee Members and
other trained field monitors to send in regular
reports that are integrated into monthly
trackers along with other data sources.
• Between April-June, 2016, over 160
incidents were reported to the IPDU SMS
Platform.

for Peace

Belun Early
Warning Early
Response
(EWER)

Belun

The Secretary of
State for
Security;
Colombia
University

• Alerts are released when
incidents or trends of serious
concern are recorded by the
EWER monitoring system
"Conflict"

Timor-Leste

• Monthly situation reviews summarize the
most notable incidents and trends recorded
by the EWER monitoring system and present
a graphical review of all incidents recorded
each month.
• Conflict Potential Analysis Reports review
EWER data over a longer period (4 months to
1 year) to better identify long-term trends
and changes to the security situation at the
sub-district, district and national levels.

• In Nigeria, peacebuilding stakeholders'
responses to early warning signals are
weak and inadequate due a to lack of
coordination between major
stakeholders, policymakers, civil society
and local actors.
• There is an urgent need to develop
conflict prevention and management
mechanisms to enhance political
stability, peace and human security in
Nigeria.
• Resources; with thousands of disputes
reported since 2009, the Belun team can
barely scratch the surface of conflict
resolution.
• Need to strengthen organizational
capacity for Belun and FM. These
national NGOs still need support in
institutional development and
management information systems
(MIS).

